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Introduction 
The American military is in a well-publicized struggle to address its 
sexual assault problem.  After the Tailhook scandal in 1991, military 
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leaders repeatedly and publically assured Congress that they would change 
the culture that previously condoned sexual discrimination and turned a 
blind eye to sexual assault.  Over the past two decades, new sexual assault 
scandals have been followed by familiar assurances and Congress’s 
patience has finally run out.  As a result, the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice is currently undergoing its most significant restructuring since it 
went into effect in 1951.   
The central issue is who is going to run the military justice system: 
military commanders, or someone else.  As it stands, military commanders 
(also called convening authorities) make the ultimate decision on whether a 
case goes to trial.
1
  Commanders receive the advice of military lawyers 
throughout the process and routinely follow that advice, but they do not 
have to. 
This reform effort is based on the assumption that commanders look at 
sexual assault cases differently than other cases.  Critics say that those who 
run the military justice system have a bias against the victims in these cases, 
where that bias is likely related to some form of sexism.
2
  Critics claim that 
when faced with the decision to prosecute these sexual assault cases, 
commanders face a conflict between their loyalty to someone that otherwise 
looks like a good soldier
3
 and their duty to seek justice for a victim who 
may have behaved in ways that commanders disapprove of, like liberal 
sexual behavior or prohibited conduct like underage drinking.
4
  
This article explores that problem.  Why is it that those in the military 
say they are taking the problem seriously, but after more than twenty years, 
it does not seem like much has changed?  To answer this question, we need 
to understand how people cognitively process legal problems that involve 
rape.  If there are problems within that cognitive process, and if those 
                                                                                                     
 1. See LAWRENCE J. MORRIS, MILITARY JUSTICE: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 41, 45, 47–
48 (2010). 
 2. See generally Regina F. Titunik, The Myth of the Macho Military, 40 POLITY 137, 
144–45 (2008). I am not exploring whether there is a rape culture in the military in that there 
is a higher percentage of rapists in the military than in the general public, either because 
rapists are attracted to the military or there is something about military culture that changes 
men who otherwise would not rape into rapists.  For a thorough discussion of this issue, see 
generally Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture, 45 DUKE L. 
J. 651 (1996). 




 4. See generally id., at 31–39. 
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problems are amplified within the military population, then that could be 
the source of the critics’ concerns. 
Part I provides background on social cognition and defines the rape 
problem that we will address.  Part II identifies two potential groups (those 
with traditional gender role expectations and who label themselves as 
conservative) that tend subscribe to certain beliefs about rape; discusses 
how those belief systems work to control behavior within those groups; and 
then drills down to the particular cognitively processes that people use to 
resolve these legal problems, focusing on how people actually use those 
beliefs about rape to get to an answer.  Part III explains that those beliefs 
about rape are inaccurate, which leads to a faulty legal reasoning process.   
Part IV first shows social cognition principles still apply in the military 
context.  This section then presents data from two studies that suggests that 
the military population that handles sexual cases and that develops sexual 
assault policy is more traditional and more conservative than the general 
population and so would be more likely to use inaccurate rape beliefs.  This 
section also shows that several inaccurate rape beliefs are amplified in the 
military context.   
From that, it appears that the critics appear to be right.  Those in the 
military who are responsible for the rape problem do not fully understand it.  
They have difficulty recognizing that a good soldier might be a rapist, and 
that a woman who “parties” might be a victim.  They cannot see the 
problem for what it really is.  They have a blind spot.   
Part V concludes by discussing how this research can inform the 
public policy debate about who should run the military justice system.  The 
primary criteria for deciding who will have responsibility for military 
justicefrom the investigator to the person exercising prosecutorial 
discretion to the panel member or jurormust be designed to identify and 
minimize this blind spot.  The issue is not whether the person responsible is 
a civilian or in the militarythe issue is whether that person will use 
inaccurate rape beliefs when resolving these cases.   
I.  Background 
A. Overview of Social Cognition 
Social cognition is “the process by which people think about and make 
sense of other people, themselves, and social situations.”
5
  Within the 
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broader field of social cognition, the social identity perspective provides a 
useful framework for understanding how people make sense of social 
situations.
6
  Generally speaking, people group themselves together based on 
shared, distinguishing features.
7
 Those within a group are “motivated to 
emphasize and secure the ways in which their group is positively distinct 
from other groups.”
8
   
These group categories “provide[] a way of organizing socially 
relevant information, and help[] in the process of both understanding and 
predicting behavior.”
9
  People tend to have more positive expectations 
about the group to which they belong (the “ingroup”) than to the groups to 
which they do not (the “outgroup”).
10
  Those within the ingroup share 
generalizations and social schemas about human behavior: “Through the 
process of self-categorization, the individual constructs the meaning of this 
social identity, along with adopting the norms (appropriate behavior) 
guiding performance in this particular group.”
11
  These expectations help to 
form group cohesion within those ingroups.
12
   
Those in the ingroup may “stigmatize others who threaten the effective 
functioning of their own group”,
13
 people like counter-socializers who 
“undermine ingroup values”
14
 and threaten the ingroup’s sense of control.  
Those in the outgroup pose a threat to the ingroup, and the shared 
generalizations that the ingroup has about the outgroup “creates a sense of 
ingroup prediction and possibly control over external threats” and “also 
protects the ingroup's superior position, maintaining status and power”.
15
 
                                                                                                     
ed. 2014). 
 6. See generally Matthew J. Hornsey, Social Identity Theory and Self-categorization 
Theory: A Historical Review, 2 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 204 (2008). 
 7. Namoi Ellemers & S. Alexander Haslam, Social Identity Theory, in HANDBOOK OF 
THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: VOLUME II 379, 380 (Paul A.M. Van Lange et al. eds., 
2012). 
 8. Id., at 382. 
 9. Id., at 381. 
 10. FISKE, supra note 5, at 420, 426. 
 11. Russell F. Korte, A Review of Social Identity Theory with Implications for 
Training and Development, 31 J. EUR. INDUSTRIAL TRAINING 166, 169 (2007); see generally 
FISKE, supra note 5, at 155, 420; John C. Turner & Katherine J. Reynolds, Self-
Categorization Theory, in HANDBOOK OF THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: VOLUME II 399, 
406 (Paul A.M. Van Lange et al. eds., 2012). 
 12. FISKE, supra note 5, at 424–25. 
 13. Id., at 425. 
 14. Id., at 425. 
 15. Id. at 426. 
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The discrete social schemas include expectations about specific kinds 
of people and the social roles they play
16
 (a brain, an athlete, a basket-case, 
a princess, and a criminal).
17
  Social schemas also include expectations 
about social events, often called scripts.
18
  These are the expectations about 
what happens and in what sequence during social situations, like going out 
to dinner or having a consensual sexual encounter.   
People use these social schemas to solve legal problems.  Within a 
limited information environment, legal problem solvers have to use 
inferences to get from the limited information to the required conclusions or 
outcome judgments.
19
  The building blocks for these inferences are those 
social schemasthe person’s expectations or generalizations about how the 
world works.
20
   
When solving these legal problems, people take the available 
information and then use their schemas to construct a story (or hypothesis) 
that makes sense.
21
  People then test the conflicting stories presented in the 
case against that story hypothesis to determine which of those conflicting 
stories is likely to be true.
22
  If information does not exist, the person will 
likely infer that facts did exist that are consistent with these schemas.  Note 
that if the underlying schemas that people use to generate these hypotheses 
are inaccurate, the reasoning process will be compromised. 
Heuristics are inferential shortcuts used to evaluate an event and arrive 
at the required outcome judgment.  People often use the representativeness 
heuristic, which is judging the probability that an event happened based on 
its similarity to those schemas.
23
  If the event matches the schemas, then the 
event very likely happened.  If the event does not match the schemas, then 
the event very likely did not happen.
24
 
                                                                                                     
 16. Id. at 154; Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 
37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 273, 281 (1989). 
 17. THE BREAKFAST CLUB (Universal Pictures 1985). 
 18. FISKE, supra note 5, at 155–56. 
 19. See generally FISKE, supra note 5, at 138; Moore, supra note 16, at 280. 
 20. See generally FISKE, supra note 5, at 151–53, 420; MICHAEL W. EYSENCK & MARK 
T. KEANE, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDENT’S HANDBOOK 501, 504–05 (6th ed. 2010); 
Moore, supra note 16, at 279–80. 
 21. See generally FISKE, supra note 5, at 141; EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 20, at 
501, 504–05; Moore, supra note 16, at 279–80. 
 22. See generally Moore, supra note 16, at 279–80. 
 23. FISKE, supra note 5, at 142; Moore, supra note 16, at 285–86. “According to the 
logic of the representativeness heuristic, a story is believable if it is similar to the [person]’s 
actual or vicarious experiences.”  Id. at 276. 
 24. See generally Moore, supra note 16, at 293–300. 
388 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 383 (2015) 
When solving problems, these schemas guide people toward outcome 
judgments that are consistent with their ingroup identity, that minimize 
their own cognitive dissonance, and that minimize conflict within their 
cultural group.
25
  Further, these schemas guide people toward outcome 
judgments that are consistent with just world theory, which is the idea that 
“good things happen to good people and bad things happen only to those 
who deserve them.”
26
  The idea is that when faced with the task of solving 
problems like these, people will solve them in a way that makes them feel 
safe in the world around them.  If the outcome judgment is consistent with 
the idea that bad things only happen to people from the outgroup, then the 
problem solver feels safe because she is in the ingroup and so that bad thing 
cannot happen to her. 
The basic model, then, is that those in the ingroup tend to share norms 
and schemas about social behavior.  When presented with a legal problem 
in a limited information environment, these people will use those schemas 
to arrive at an outcome judgment that is consistent with their group 
identities and worldviews. 
Deciding what happened in a sexual assault case is a social cognition 
problem.  In a rape case, the legal problem solver has to make sense of the 
social actions of unfamiliar people and has to make sense of a social 
situation for which there are probably no outside witnesses.  We should 
expect that the problem solver will need to rely on social schemas to solve 
the problem, will use the social schemas that reflect their group identity, 
and will solve the problem in a way that is consistent with that group 
identity.  
B. What Kind of Rape Are We Talking About? 
Throughout this article I will use “rape” and “sexual assault” 
interchangeably to describe penetrative, non-consensual sexual acts.  
However, when I use those terms, I will be focusing on a subset of rapes or 
                                                                                                     
 25. Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, 
in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 732 (2010); see generally FISKE, 
supra note 5, at 249–55, 426–27; Michael A. Hogg et al., A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical 
Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory, 58 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 255, 257 
(1995). 
 26. Kimberly A. Lonsway & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Rape Myths: In Review, 18 
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 133, 136 (1999) [hereinafter Rape Myths]; see also Mark A. Whatley, 
Victim Characteristics Influencing Attributions of Responsibility to Rape Victims: A Meta-
Analysis, 1 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 81, 83 (1996). 
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sexual assaults.  I will be focusing on sexual assault by an adult man of an 
adult woman
27
 where society would recognize that consensual sex between 
those two is plausible.  This category includes assaults by offenders who 
are friends, acquaintances, current and former dates and boyfriends, current 
and former husbands, employers, fellow employees, and the like.  Research 
suggests that this category makes up roughly half to three-quarters of all 
rapes.
28
  This category excludes the remaining rapes that are committed by 
offenders who are otherwise related to the victim (fathers, step-fathers, 
uncles, etc.) or who are strangers. 
This is the category that the military’s critics have in mind: male 
service members assaulting female service members, as employers, co-
workers, dates, friends, acquaintances.  To the critics, this is the category 
that the military does not take seriously.  
This category is difficult to name.  It is narrower than “non-stranger” 
and broader than “acquaintance” or “date.”  And the real dividing line is not 
related to the type of offender or the characteristics of the victim, but 
whether an outsider might think that consent was a possibility.  We 
generally do not think consent is relevant in incest or stranger rape, but we 
do for the rest. 
In this “consent is relevant” category, the basic legal conflicts are 
whether the woman consented, and if she did not consent, whether the man 
was reasonably mistaken about that lack of consent.  While force is still an 
element of rape in many statutes, in the common law force really just 
served a notice function (if the man has to use that much force, enough to 
overcome reasonable resistance, then he was on notice that the woman was 
not consenting and so could not be reasonably mistaken)
29
 and in many 
                                                                                                     
 27. Recognizing that men are also victims of sexual assault and women can commit 
sexual assault, this article is limited to a discussion of men assaulting women.  In 2013, 86% 
of the victims who filed unrestricted reports in the Department of Defense were female.  
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 90 (2013).  Only 
3% of the subjects in completed investigations were female.  Id. at 92. 
 28. Estimates are that 10–16% of women will be sexually assaulted in their lifetime.  
See generally JODY RAPHAEL, RAPE IS RAPE 86 (2013).  In one study, victims reported the 
following relationships with their offenders: stranger, 22%; father or step-father, 11%; other 
relatives, 16%; boyfriend or ex-boyfriend, 10%; other non-stranger, non-relatives, 29%.  
NATI’L VICTIM CTR., RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 4 (1992).  Another study 
of forcible rapes found the following relationships: stranger, 6%; husbands and ex-husbands, 
3%; fathers, step-fathers, and other relatives, 19%; boyfriends, 26%; friend and classmates, 
29%; other nonrelatives, 15%.  DEAN G. KIPATRICK ET AL., DRUG-FACILITATED, 
INCAPACITATED, AND FORCIBLE RAPE: A NATIONAL SURVEY 30–31 (2007).    
 29. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1107–08, 1131 (1986). 
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modern statutes force now serves as an aggravating factor.
30
 The central 
legal issues are consent and mistake as to consent. 
II.  Social Cognition in Legal Problems Involving Rape 
To solve the central legal issues of consent or mistake as to consent, 
people use social schemas that are consistent with their group identities and 
choose outcome judgments that will minimize dissonance and leave them 
feeling safe within the world.  Unfortunately, many of those 
schemascommonly called rape mythsare inaccurate.  Kimberly 
Lonsway and Louise Fitzgerald define rape myths as those attitudes and 
beliefs about sexual assault “that are generally false but are widely and 
persistently held, and that serve to deny and justify male sexual aggression 
against women.”
31
  The first part of that definition describes the schemas 
while the second describes the function served by those schemas: ingroup 
control of an outgroup.   
A. The Ingroups 
Lonsway and Fitzgerald reviewed rape myth acceptance literature and 
identified a potential ingroup: those who hold traditional gender role 
beliefs.
32
  To the extent that “traditional gender role beliefs” constitutes a 
measurable global construct,
33
 that construct has many facets. 
                                                                                                     
 30. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (2014). 
 31. Lonsway & Fitzgerald, Rape Myths, supra note 26, at 134 (emphasis omitted). 
 32. Id., at 155. 
 33. Several scales measure traditional sex roles belief:  the Sex Role Stereotyping 
scale (SRS), Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 217 (1980) [hereinafter Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape]; the 
Ambivalent Sexism Inventory – Benign Sexism (ASI-BS), Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, 
The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, 70 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 491 (1996) [hereinafter The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory]; 
the Attitudes Toward Women Scale (AWS), Janet T. Spence et al., A Short Version of the 
Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS), 2 BULL. PSYCONOMIC SOC'Y 218 (1973); the Sex-Role 
Egalitarianism Scale (SRES), Carole A. Beere et al., The Sex-Role Egalitarian Scale: A 
Measure of Attitudes Toward Equality Between the Sexes, 10 SEX ROLES 563 (1984), Lynda 
A. King & Daniel W. King, Sex-Role Egalitarianism Scale: Development, Psychometric 
Properties, and Recommendations for Future Research, 21 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 71 (1997);  
the Gender Role Beliefs Scale (GRBS), Paula S. Kerr & Ronald R. Holden, Development of 
the Gender Role Beliefs Scale (GRBS), 11 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 3 (1996); the 
Sexist Attitudes Toward Women Scale (SATWS), Peter L. Benson & Steven Vincent, 
Development and Validation of the Sexist Attitudes Toward Women Scale (SATWS), 5 
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Those who hold traditional gender role beliefs may believe that the 
family should be structured as a patriarchy, where the man ultimately 
makes the important decisions.
34
  They may also believe that, even if 
decisions should be made equally, the family labor should be divided such 
that women should work at home, possibly believing that women are better 
caregivers for the children and better at managing the household, while men 
have higher income earning potential (or both).
35
  One step beyond that 
(and possibly more hostile) is that women should not have an equal role in 
male-dominated occupations.
36
   
Another facet encompasses the courtship ritual, with the expectation 
that the man is the aggressive pursuer while the woman is passive and 
chooses among those who are pursuing her.
37
  Last, a facet could be sexual 
conservatism, or more accurately, female sexual conservatismthat is, 
“restrictions on the appropriateness of sexual partners, sexual acts, 
conditions or circumstances under which sex should occur, and so on.”
38
  
Very likely, sexual conservatism is measured by a subconstruct of Peter 
Glick and Susan Fiske’s Benign Sexism scale, which they label 
“complimentary gender differentiation.”
39
  This is the idea that women are 
pure, moral, and ladylike and we should respect that femininity.
40
  Women 
who are pure, moral, and ladylike are on one end of the spectrum.  The 
sexually liberated are on the other.   
Note that traditional gender role beliefs differ from hostile sexism.  
Hostile sexism is based on beliefs that women are inferior, and on hostile 
emotions toward women.
41
  Traditional sex role beliefs (or benevolent or 
                                                                                                     
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 276 (1980); and the Neosexism Scale, Francine Tougas, Neosexism: 
Plus Ca Change, Plus C'est Pareil, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 842 (1995).   
 34. The SRS, SRES, AWS, GRBS, and SATWS all contain an item that reflects this 
facet. 
 35. See Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and Benevolent 
Sexism as Complementary Justifications for Gender Inequality, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 109, 
110 (2001) [hereinafter An Ambivalent Alliance].  The SRS, AWS, SRES, GRBS, SATWS 
all contain items that test this facet. 
 36. The SRES, AWS, GRBS, and SATWS contain items that measure this facet.  The 
Neosexism scale measures this facet more directly. 
 37. The SRS, SRES, and GRBS all contain items that measure this facet. 
 38. Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, supra note 33, at 219.  Scales with items 
that test sexual conservatism include the AWS, GRBS, and SATWS.    
 39. An Ambivalent Alliance, supra note 35, at 111.   
 40. The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, supra note 353, at 512. The SRS, GRBS, 
SATWS also contain items that measure this facet. 
 41. Gordon B. Forbes et al., First—and Second—Generation Measures of Sexism, 
Rape Myths and Related Beliefs, and Hostility Toward Women, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
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benign sexism) are based on beliefs about the best roles for each sex and on 
positive emotions related to protection, being protected, and affection.
42
  
Both hostile and benevolent sexism perpetuate patriarchy: “Hostile sexist 
beliefs in women’s incompetence at agentic tasks characterize women as 
unfit to wield power over economic, legal, and political institutions, 
whereas benevolent sexism provides a comfortable rationalization for 
confining women to domestic roles.”
43
  Benevolent sexism “promises that 
men’s power will be used to women’s advantage”
44
 by securing women 
protection and providing them comforts. 
When looking at the “nomological net” of rape myth acceptance, 
Lonsway and Fitzgerald found “at its core gender, traditional gender role 
attitudes [and] negative attitudes toward women”.
45
  Lonsway and 
Fitzgerald also found that the “critical construct in understanding rape myth 
acceptance is a general hostility toward women.”
46
  Generally, this has to 
do with the male actors (the rapists) in the events, and not those who judge 
the events.  The relationship between men who score high on hostile sexism 
scales and their involvement in coercive sexual assault experiences is well 
established.
47
   
However, for our purposes, overtly hostile sexists and misogynists are 
not the relevant ingroup.  They may make up a small group (which might 
have a higher percentage of rapists) but they are now an outgroup.  It is 
unlikely that those who are charged with solving these legal problems 
(investigators, district attorneys, judges, and jurors), with a narrow focus on 
consent or mistake of fact about consent would use overtly misogynistic 
schemas to solve those problems any more than they would rely on overtly 
racist schemas to solve other legal problems.
48
  The outliers who do rely on 
these beliefs are exposed and ridiculed.
49
  
                                                                                                     
WOMEN 236, 240 (2004); An Ambivalent Alliance, supra note 35, at 110.   
 42. See The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, supra note 353, at 491; see also An 
Ambivalent Alliance, supra note 35; Forbes et al., supra note 41, at 239. 
 43. The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, supra note 42, at 492. 
 44. An Ambivalent Alliance, supra note 35, at 111.   
 45. Rape Myths, supra note 26, at 155.   
 46. Kimberly A. Lonsway & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Attitudinal Antecedents of Rape 
Myth Acceptance: A Theoretical and Empirical Reexamination, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 704, 705 (1995); see generally Forbes et al., supra note 41, at 240–42. 
 47.  See Forbes et al., supra note 41, at 251; Eliana Suarez & Tahany M. Gadalla, Stop 
Blaming the Victim: A Meta-Analysis on Rape Myths, 25 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2010, 
2025 (2010). 
 48. See generally Forbes et al., supra note 41, at 238. 
 49. See, e.g., Judge Publically Reprimanded Over Teen Rape Comments, CBS NEWS 
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While men tend to accept inaccurate rape schemas more than women, 
men as a category are not the relevant ingroup, either.  Glick and Fiske 
argue that the unique relationship between men and women, where both 
need each other and where women share dyadic power, prevents an 
ingroup/outgroup separation along sex lines.
50
  Men do not feel like they are 
exploiting women (they are providing for and protecting them) and women 
in this ingroup do not feel exploited (they play an important social role and 
are protected).   
Rather, the potential ingroup consists of those who share those 
traditional gender role beliefs, both men and women,
51
 while the outgroup 
consists of those who threaten itthose with nontraditional gender role 
beliefs.
52
   
Another potential ingroup/outgroup divide is conservatism.  This 
construct has three major facets: status-quo conservatism (“an enduring 
inclination to favor stability and preservation of the status quo over social 
change”); laissez-faire conservatism (“persistent preference for a free 
market and limited government intervention in the economy”) and social 
conservatism (“an enduring predisposition, in all matters political and 
social, to favor obedience and conformity (oneness and sameness) over 
freedom and difference.”
53
  That last facet, social conservatism, includes an 
                                                                                                     
(Jul. 22, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/montana-judge-to-be-publicly-reprimanded-
over-teen-rape-comments/; Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Sentences Rapist to Community 
Service at Rape Crisis Center; Says Victim, 14, Wasn’t Virgin, ABA J. (May 6, 2014), 
http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/judge_sentences_rapist_to_community_service_at
_rape_crisis_center_says_vict; Kristine Guerra, Controversial Rape Sentence Puts Judge in 
Spotlight, USA TODAY (May 27, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
nation/2014/05/27/judge-rape-sentence-home-detention/9630267/. 
 50. The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, supra note 33, at 492. Glick and Fiske theorize 
that because sexism includes both a subtle, hostile component and a benign component, that 
sexism is ambivalent. Id. at 491–92. They developed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory 
which contains two subscales, Hostile Sexism (ASI-HS) and Benevolent Sexism (ASI-BS). 
Id. at 500. Their ASI-HS scale is not measuring overtly misogynistic and adversarial beliefs 
like those measured by Martha Burt’s Adversarial Sexual Beliefs scale—it measures much 
more subtle (but hostile) beliefs. See also Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, supra note 
33, at 219. 
 51. The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, supra note 42, at 507; Kathryn B. Anderson et 
al., Individual Differences and Attitudes Toward Rape: A Meta-Analytic Review, 23 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 295, 312 (1997). 
 52. The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, supra note 42, at 492. 
 53. Karen Stenner, Three Kinds of “Conservatism”, 20 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 142, 142 
(2009).  Two scales, the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale and the Social Dominance 
Orientation Scale, are often used to measure facets of conservatism.  See generally Bernard 
E. Whitley, Jr., Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, and Prejudice, 
77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 126 (1999). 
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anti-hedonist component,
54
 which is a “tendency to regard pleasure as 
necessarily bad or ‘sinful’ . . . This applies particularly to sex . . . .”
55
 
While these two ingroup constructs do not perfectly overlap, the 
constructs do share conceptual common ground.  Social conservatism, a 
facet of conservatism, likely includes a facet related to traditional gender 
role beliefs, where social conservatism serves as an emergent variable with 
traditional gender role beliefs as a sub-facet.  In particular, a facet of social 
conservatism (sexual conservatism or anti-hedonism) overlaps with a facet 
of benign sexism or traditional gender role expectations (sexual 
conservatism or complimentary gender differentiation).  We should expect 
that the constructs of conservatism and traditional gender role beliefs will 
be correlated, and conservatism has been found to be highly correlated with 
traditional sex role beliefs.
56
 
B.  Group Membership, Rape Schema Acceptance, and Legal Control 
Members of the ingroup identify with each other according to their 
beliefs and these larger belief systems translate into discrete schemas that 
serve to enforce that group cohesion.  Here, the ingroup consists of those 
who share beliefs about how men and women should behave and those who 
are conservative, where the two likely overlap and where sexual 
conservatism plays a central role.  Not surprisingly, those with traditional 
gender role beliefs tend to endorse certain rape schemas more than those 
with non-traditional gender role beliefs,
57
 as do those with conservative 
worldviews compared to those with liberal worldviews.
58
   
                                                                                                     
 54. Glenn D. Wilson, The Factor Structure of the C-Scale, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
CONSERVATISM 89 (Glenn D. Wilson ed., 1973). 
 55. Glenn D. Wilson, The Concept of Conservatism, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
CONSERVATISM 8 (Glenn D. Wilson ed., 1973). 
 56. Knud S. Larsen & Ed Long, Attitudes Toward Sex Roles: Traditional or 
Egalitarian?, 19 SEX ROLES 1, 10 (1988); William D. Walker et al., Authoritarianism and 
Sexual Aggression, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1036, 1038 (1993) (using the Right 
Wing Authoritarianism scale). 
 57. See Dominic Abrams et al., Perceptions of Stranger and Acquaintance Rape: The 
Role of Benevolent and Hostile Sexism in Victim Blame and Rape Proclivity, 84 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 111, 111 (2003) (noting the correlation between ASI-BS and 
RMA); Anderson et al., supra note 51, at 312; Forbes et al., supra note 41, at 250 (linking 
Neosexism, AWS, and for women only, ASI-BS); G. Tendayi Viki & Dominic Abrams, But 
She Was Unfaithful: Benevolent Sexism and Reactions to Rape Victims Who Violate 
Traditional Gender Role Expectations, 47 SEX ROLES 289 (2002) (noting a correlation 
between ASI-BS to RMA).   
 58. Anderson et al., supra note 51, at 312; Walker et al., supra note 56, at 1037–38 
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These rape schemas fall into two broad categories: schemas that 
excuse the man, and schemas that blame the woman. Schemas that excuse 
the man include schemas related to beliefs that only deviant men rape, and 
therefore normal-looking men do not mean to rape anyone.  Schemas that 
blame the woman include schemas related to beliefs that women ask for it 
by the way they behave sexually, or that women secretly want to be forced 
to have intercourse.  Some schemas connect two.  These are beliefs that 




In a broad sense, these generalizations about how men and women 
behave control behavior within the ingroup.
60
  For example, “Benevolent 
sexism is directed toward traditional women who adhere to narrow gender 
roles: housewives, in particular . . . [Sexism] support[s] the status quo for 
women, by rewarding subordinate women with male protection and 
appreciation for their alleged purity but threatening uppity women with 
dislike and exclusion.”
61
  Further, “The correlation between [sexist] beliefs 
and acceptance of rape myths probably reflects the self-protection 
perception that women who follow traditional roles will be protected by 
men and that only women who depart from these roles are victims of 
rape.”
62
   
Building on Glick and Fiske’s subconstructs within the Ambivalent 
Sexism Inventory and Ambivalence Toward Men Inventory, Kristine 
Chapleau and her colleagues hypothesized that “it might be the case that 
some people are tougher on rape victims and more lenient toward rapists 
because they believe that women should be ladies.”
63
  They found that the 
subcomponent that women should behave like ladies was responsible for 
the association between benevolent sexism toward women and rape myth 
                                                                                                     
(using the Right Wing Authoritarianism scale). 
 59. See generally Diana L. Payne et al., Rape Myth Acceptance: Exploration of Its 
Structure and Its Measurement Using the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale, 33 J. RES. 
PERSONALITY 27 (1999); Martha Burt, Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape, in 
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 27 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 
1991).  The scale items used in the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale are examples of the 
discrete schemas. 
 60. FISKE, supra note 5, at 442–43. 
 61. FISKE, supra note 5, at 436–37. 
 62. Forbes et al., supra note 41, at 250. 
 63. Kristine M. Chapleau et al., How Ambivalent Sexism Toward Women and Men 
Support Rape Myth Acceptance, 57 SEX ROLES 131, 132 (2007). 
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acceptance
64
which is consistent with this being a marker of which 
women are ingroup (the ladylike) and which are outgroup (the un-ladylike).   
They also hypothesized that some people are tougher on rape victims 
and more lenient toward rapists because they believe that “men are 
chivalrous toward women and thus would not act inappropriately unless 
invited by the woman”.
65
  They found that a subcomponent of benevolent 
sexism toward men, “the belief that a woman is incomplete without the love 
of a man” was the strongest predictor for rape myth acceptance among 
those subcomponents, and that “suggests that participants may view the 
aggressor as a potential romantic partner, rather than a rapist.”
66
  Further, 
participants who responded positively to a subcomponent that measured 
admiration for men “for their masculine attributes of strength, risk-taking, 
and stoicism are less likely to hold men accountable for rape.”
67
  Both of 
these are consistent with attitudes toward ingroup menmen with those 
features are “good” guys. 
For conservatism, these schemas also enhance ingroup cohesion and 
outgroup control.  The authors of one study suggest that this is because 
“conservative political ideologies that place the responsibility on the 
individual for his or her plight may lead one to believe in women’s 
responsibility for sexual victimization.”
68
   
One mechanism for this social control is the law. Those schemas and 
the operationalization of those schemas within the legal system (by not 
pursuing charges against the man or by acquitting him) allow the ingroup to 
control both its members and the outgroup members.
69
  The social contract 
is:  Men, if you behave in the way we expect (stay ingroup, do not jump out 
of the bushes and attack women), then we will extend you the fullest 
protection of the law.  You have to really mess up (have an unreasonable 
belief that the woman is not consenting) before you will face sanctions.   
And women, if you behave in ways we do not approve of (you follow 
non-traditional gender roles or are sexually liberal), then in most cases, we 
will not extend you the protection of the lawwe will infer that you 
consented and are lying, or that you behaved in a way that a good guy 
                                                                                                     
 64. Id. at 135. 
 65. Id. at 132. 
 66. Id. at 135. 
 67. Id. at 135–36. 
 68. Anderson et al., supra note 51, at 312. 
 69. See generally Kristine M. Chapleau & Debra L. Oswald, A System Justification 
View of Sexual Violence: Legitimizing Gender Inequality and Reduced Moral Outrage Are 
Connected to Greater Rape Myth Acceptance, 15 J. TRAUMA & DISSOCIATION 204 (2014). 
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would reasonably misinterpret.  If you want the protection of the law, you 
better behave the way we want you to. 
C. Rape Schemas in Legal Problem Solving 
These abstract reasoning systems become concrete when someone 
within the ingroup needs to solve a particular sexual assault problem.  
When we look at the various rape myths identified by Diana Payne and 
colleagues
70
 from the prospective of people from the ingroup who have 
figure out how a good, ingroup man was accused of rape, patterns emerge.   
The central rape schema is an event schema about what “real” rape 
looks like: “real” rape involves a deviant man who uses violence and 
weapons against a woman who is a stranger, causing injuries in the 
process.
71
 And it is reinforced by person schemas about rapists.  “Real” 
rapists come from the outgroup:  they are violent, sexual deviants.  When 
good, ingroup women get raped, it is by those outgroup men.  The corollary 
to this central rape schema is the schema that ingroup men (good, normal 
guys) do not rape.   
When the problem solver uses the schema that only deviants rape and 
is then presented with a defendant who does not look like a deviantin 
fact, is from the ingroupthe problem solver likely forms the hypothesis 
that this man could not be a rapist.  Therefore, either the man made a 
mistake or the woman really did consent.   
While we should not expect the legal problem solvers will disregard 
the law, we should expect that they will be very cautious when given a case 
                                                                                                     
 70. For this discussion, I am relying on the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale 
found in Payne et al., supra note 59 and Sarah McMahan & G. Lawrence Farmer, An 
Updated Measure for Assessing Subtle Rape Myths, 35 SOC. WORK RES. 71 (2011).   Diane 
Payne and colleagues used exhaustive factor analysis to categorize forty rape schemas into 
seven categories.  Sarah McMahan and Lawrence Farmer later conducted focus group 
testing on Payne’s scale and dropped three categories, two of which I am also not going to 
focus on.  Id. at 74.  The first is the myth that rape is a trivial event.  That category presumes 
that a rape had occurred but that the rape was not socially significant; however, in this 
article, I am focusing on schemas that help people decide whether a rape has occurred.  I 
also am not going to focus on the rape schema that women want to be forced into sex.  While 
this rape schema still occasionally pops up in popular culture, in the McMahan and Farmer 
study, the focus groups said that these views were now outdated and too overtly sexist. Id. 
The interesting thing about this latter category is that it represented a justification for 
ingroup rape of ingroup women, rather than ingroup rape of outgroup women.  The idea is 
that “good” women want to be overpowered by “good” men, like Scarlett O’Hara was by 
Rhett Butler. 
 71. Burt, supra note 59, at 27. 
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involving an ingroup man.  In a society where sex role socialization teaches 
men to take the risk in sexual situations,
72
 those in the ingroup would want 
to give the man every benefit when reviewing the facts.  He is, after all, one 
of them.
73
   
Many of the rape schemas serve to reinforce the hypothesis of mistake 
as to consent.  The mistake hypothesis has two components: either some 
outside condition prevented the man from being able to understand signs of 
non-consent; or the woman’s signs were not clear enough (or some 
combination of both). 
Toward the “outside conditions” mistake, these schemas include, “A 
good, normal guy sometimes cannot control his sexual urges after a woman 
has turned him on.”  In that case, the schema is that a man can involuntarily 
lose control of himself when his sex drive reaches a tipping point and so not 
be able to notice that the woman is not consenting.  According to the 
ingroup problem solver, that would be a reasonable mistake for a good guy 
to make.   
Another outside condition is alcohol.  These schemas are, “If a man is 
drunk, he probably does not know what he is doing,” or, “If both people are 
drunk, then they are both responsible for what happens.”
74
  The reasoning is 
the samea good but drunk man is not able to understand that a woman is 
not consenting, and according to the ingroup problem solver, that would be 
a reasonable mistake for a good guy to make.   
The “unclear signs” or miscommunication schemas revolve around the 
generalization that good guys sometimes do not understand when a woman 
says no.  One is the schema that “Women who behave in non-traditional 
                                                                                                     
 72. Amy Grubb & Emily Turner, Attribution of Blame in Rape Cases: A Review of the 
Impact of Rape Myth Acceptance, Gender Role Conformity, and Substance Use on Victim 
Blaming, 17 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 443, 446 (2012). 
 73. For example, in a recent opinion by the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal 
Appeals in a non-stranger rape case, the court said: 
Although we recognize that the Appellant's typed statement to NCIS in some form admits 
culpability, we express grave concern about the lack of detail in the statement, particularly 
in light of the fact that NCIS interviewed the Appellant for almost two hours, yet produced a 
statement about the incident consisting of a mere 14 lines. 
United States v. Lucas, No. 201100372, 2012 CCA Lexis 322, at *12 n.6 (N-M. Ct. Crim. 
App. Aug. 28, 2012) (emphasis added).  The practice of taking those kinds of short 
statements is commonplace in military investigations and the court has not expressed grave 
concern about the practice in criminal cases involving outgroup men.  But here, in a case 
involving an ingroup man, the court expresses grave concern about the practice.     
 74. Related to this is the idea that if both are drunk, then both should be charged with 
rape.  E.g. United States v. Redmon, No. 201300077, 2014 CCA LEXIS 369 (N-M Ct. Crim. 
App. June 26, 2014) (unpublished).   
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ways (drinking, going to bars without her boyfriend or husband, having 
extra-marital sex, wearing provocative clothes) assume the risk.”  When we 
are dealing with outgroup, deviant rapists, that risk is the risk of rape.  
When we are dealing with ingroup, good guys, that risk is the risk of 
miscommunication.  If a bad, outgroup woman does those things, then a 
good, ingroup man can reasonably mistake that behavior as signs of 
consent. 
Related is the schema that “women often do not clearly say ‘no.’”
75
 
The more extreme version of this is the schema that “Women sometimes 
say ‘no’ when they mean ‘yes.’”
76
  The event schema is that women (both 
ingroup and outgroup) will say no or give equivocal signals or offer token 
resistance so that the man will not think that they are cheap or easy, and the 
good, ingroup man is expected to keep persisting when hearing a weak 
“no.”  The man is expected to continue in the face of resistance until the 
woman screams or fights backthereby clearly communicating her lack of 
consent.  That is itself another event schema, “Real victims fight back.”
77
  
The reasoning that follows is that if the woman does not follow her script, 
then the good, ingroup man can reasonably believe that she consented.      
Shifting now to the second part of the hypothesis (the reason a good 
guy is under the suspicion is that she really did consent and is lying about it 
now), several rape schemas support the hypothesis.  The first is, “She asked 
for it.”
78
  This is closely related to the “she assumed the risk (of a mistake)” 
schema.
79
  Instead of being used to show the reasonableness of the man’s 
mistake, now the schema is used to show that the woman actually 
consented.  The proof that she consented is the evidence that she engaged in 
non-traditional sexual behavior (drinking, going to bars without her 
boyfriend or husband, having a history of extra-marital sex, wearing 
provocative clothes) before the event.  For the ingroup, this is what 
outgroup women do when they want to have consensual sex.  If a woman 
does those things, she is essentially signaling a blanket consent to sex.
80
   
                                                                                                     
 75. Payne et al., supra note 59, at 50. 
 76. Id. at 64 (noting the schema types, including those where women actually wanted 
the event to occur). 
 77. Id. at 49–52 (noting multiple examples of responses wherein individuals did not 
view an act as rape where the woman did not struggle to defend herself). 
 78. Id. (showing multiple responses of individuals who view certain actions, such as 
dressing suggestively, as the victim being responsible).  
 79. Id. (noting responses wherein some individuals viewed certain behavior as 
implying sexual willingness, such as going to a man’s apartment on a first date). 
 80. A variant of this applies to ingroup behaviors, too, in that a woman who accepts 
dinner and movie from a man in a traditional courtship is now in his sexual debt: by 
400 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 383 (2015) 
The next schema in the reasoning chain is that outgroup women lie 
about rape.
81
  The schema is that an outgroup woman (or a woman soon 
to be cast out of the ingroup when this process is over) will often lie 
about rape to protect her reputation, her relationships (if this looks like 
cheating); her self-esteem (because she regrets the sex or feels cheap); 
or because she is crazy or vindictive.
82
  When a male decision-maker 
looks at one of these fact patterns, he may think, “I have had sex 
according to the same script that is in this fact pattern.  What if she had 
been crazy or vindictive?  But for the grace of God go I.” 
D. The Entire Flow 
Reviewing this discussion from the perspective of those charged 
with solving the legal problem, the basic cognitive pathway is 
acceptance of traditional gender role beliefs or conservatism, which is 
associated with acceptance of these rape schemas.  We saw above that 
studies connect traditional gender role beliefs and conservatism with the 
acceptance of these rape schemas.  We should expect that those who 
follow this pathway will ultimately resolve the problem in favor of the 
man, and research has shown that the acceptance of these rape schemas 
is associated with siding with the man in the ultimate normative 
judgment about blame.
83
   
Social science research provides strong evidence of this entire 
cognitive pathway, from ingroup identification to the acceptance of 
these rape schemas to outcome judgments that favor the man.  Some 
studies have found a connection directly from the acceptance of 
traditional gender role beliefs to the ultimate judgment, skipping the 
                                                                                                     
accepting those things, she signaled her consent to sex.  See generally Susan A. Basow & 
Alexandra Minieri, “You Owe Me”: Effects of Date Cost, Who Pays, Participant Gender, 
and Rape Myth Beliefs on Perceptions of Rape, 26 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 479 (2011). 
 81. Payne et al., supra note 59, at 49–52 (noting responses where woman lied about 
rape in order to cover up other actions, such as an illicit affair). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See generally Barbara Krahe, Social Psychological Issues in the Study of Rape, 2 
EUR. SOC. PSYCHOL. 279 (1991); G. Tendayi Viki et al., Evaluating Stranger and 
Acquaintance Rape: The Role of Benevolent Sexism in Perpetrator Blame and 
Recommended Sentence Length, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 295 (2004); Charlene Muehlenhard, 
Misinterpreting Dating Behaviors and the Risk of Date Rape, 6 J. SOC. & CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 20 (1988). 
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schemas.
84




III.  The Rape Schemas Are Inaccurate or Sexist 
As discussed above, if the schemas that people use during the 
inference process are faulty, then the entire reasoning process is 
compromised.  The rape schemas we just discussed are faulty.  They are 
inaccurate or obviously sexist.
86
     
The central rape schema, that rape involves a deviant man who uses 
violence and weapons against a woman, is inaccurate.  These cases 
(stranger rapes) do occur and when they come up they are treated seriously 
by the ingroup; however, most rapes do not follow this script.  Most 
forcible rapes (78–89%) are committed by a man that the woman knows: 
friend, acquaintance, current and former date and boyfriend, current and 
former husband, employer, fellow employee, father, step-father, uncle.
87
  
Further research shows that a small percentage (6%) of men from the 
ingroup commit most rapes.
88
   
The “mistake” schemas are also inaccurate or obviously sexist.  For 
example, except in rare circumstances, the law does not allow outside 
                                                                                                     
 84. See generally Rosanne Proite et al., Gender, Sex-role Stereotypes, and the 
Attribution of Responsibility for Date and Acquaintance Rape, 34 J. C. STUDENT DEV. 411 
(1993). 
 85. See generally Viki & Abrams, supra note 57; Abrams et al., supra note 57; 
Niwako Yamawaki, Rape Perception and the Function of Ambivalent Sexism and Gender-
Role Traditionality, 22 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 406 (2007); Szymanski et al., supra 
note 57. 
 86. A complete discussion to prove this claim is beyond the scope of this article, and 
many others have attempted to prove that claim.  See generally Cultural Myths and Supports 
for Rape, supra note 33; Burt, Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape, supra note 71; Rape 
Myths, supra note 26; JOANNA BOURKE, RAPE (2007); Katie M. Edwards et al., Rape Myths: 
History, Individual and Institutional-Level Presence, and Implications for Change, 65 SEX 
ROLES 761 (2011); Estrich, supra note 29. 
 87. NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER, supra note 28, at 4; KIPATRICK ET AL., supra note 28, at 
30.  See generally RAPHAEL, supra note 28, at 89. 
 88. In a study of 1,882 male college students, David Lisak and Paul Miller found that 
6% reported that they had committed rape or attempted rape.  David Lisak & Paul A. Miller, 
Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending Among Undetected Rapists, 17 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 
73, 76, 78 (2002).  Lisak and Miller also found that a majority of these men were repeat 
offenders, such that “a relatively small proportion of men are responsible for a large number 
of rapes”.  Id. at 80. See also Michele L. Ybarra & Kimberly J. Mitchell, Prevalence Rates 
of Male and Female Sexual Violence Perpetrators in a National Sample of Adolescents, 
JAMA PEDIATRICS (Oct. 7, 2013), http://archpedi.jamanetwork.com. 
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conditions like excitement or intoxication to excuse criminal conduct.  
Generally, the only place where excitement mitigates a crime is in 
homicide, where murder may be reduced to manslaughter if, for example, 
someone catches their spouse in bed with another person or is adequately 
provoked by some type of violence coming from the victim.
89
  Other than 
that, the law does not let someone get away with a crime because the person 
really wants something:  “But the diamond was really pretty and I really, 
really wanted it” is not a legal excuse.  Likewise, the law does not let a 
defendant get away with robbery if he really wants money; asks a woman 
for $50; she says she will only give him $25; but he gets really, really 
excited and takes the full $50.
90
   
As for alcohol, in common law crimes, voluntary intoxication is a 
failure of proof defense, meaning the man needs to be so drunk that he 
could not have formed the specific intent required by the crime.
91
  For 
general intent crimes, if a person gets drunk, that person is morally 
blameworthy for any harm he causes while drunkfor example, like 
somehow missing the indications that he was trespassing.  In the common 
law, rape is a general intent crime. If a man gets drunk and misses the signs 
that the woman has not consented, then any evidence that he was drunk 
should not matter.  He should still be blameworthy.   
The difference in how the law treats these conditions in rape cases 
versus how it treats them in other crimes like robbery, murder, or non-
sexual assault is due to sexism.
92
  We are willing to say that these 
conditions make conduct or mistakes “reasonable” in sexual assault cases, 
but not in others. 
The mistake schemas related to a miscommunication between the man 
and woman are also inaccurate, exaggerated, or obviously sexist.  Looking 
first at the schema that a woman asks for it by the way she behaves or 
dresses (and so a man can be confused about whether she consented), one 
of the corollaries to that schema is that a woman will fight back if she really 
does not want sex.  If a woman fights back, we assume the man is now on 
fair notice that she really means “no.”  But we now know that some female 
(and male) rape victims experience involuntary nervous system responses 
that may prevent them from speaking or moving, much less fighting back.
93
  
                                                                                                     
 89. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 535–37 (5th ed. 2009). 
 90. This example has been used in various rape schema debiasing programs. 
 91. See DRESSLER, supra note 89, at 327. 
 92. See Estrich, supra note 29, at 1125–26 (providing many examples of differences 
like these, where the only plausible explanation for their existence is sexism). 
 93. See generally Brian M. Marx et al., Tonic Immobility as an Evolved Predator 
THE MILITARY'S SEXUAL ASSAULT BLIND SPOT 403 
One study by Mary Koss and colleagues found that 76.6% of women in 
acquaintance rape cases “turned cold.”
94
  While 69.6% reported that they 
struggled somehow (which would not likely be enough to provide fair 
notice), only 11.2% screamed or tried to run away.
95
   
The “she asked for it” schema confounds potential for sex with 
consent to sex.
96
  How a woman behaves may give signals as to whether she 
might be interested in sex at some point, but in the moment right before the 
sexual act, more is required.  If someone dresses up to go to an open house 
and expresses interest in buying the house to the seller, the seller cannot 
then hand the potential buyer a piece of paper saying, “It is now yours at 
my asking price.”  More is required.  Potential for consent does not equal 
consent. 
Current research on sexual scripts shows that the actual script is much 
more complicated than the schema suggests, where women use subtle clues 
to communicate consent or lack of consent—and where men also 
understand those clues.
97
  While men may misinterpret behavior and 
communication early in the relationship as signals that a romantic 
relationship might be an option,
98
 when they are at the critical moment, they 
understand what “no” means.   
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Research suggests that 94% of men understand when a woman has not 
consented to sex and they stop.
99
  In their own experiences, they may have 
seen the potential for sex, pursued itmaybe while they were themselves 
drunkand later found out through the normal ways that people say “no” 
that she did not want sex, and stopped. They may have left the encounter 
frustrated, but they did not leave as rapists.  The vast majority of men have 
not and would not penetrate an unwilling woman.  They would never be 
Biff from Back to the Future or Bug from Uncle Buck, and they know that 
something is wrong when they watch the scenes in those moviesbecause 
they understand the signs.    
Six percent of men keep going.  Remember that in the Koss study, 
76.6% of the women turned cold, 69.6% struggled, and 11.2% screamed or 
tried to run away.  In addition, 83% reasoned or pled with the man— 
probably saying things like, “No” and “I don’t want to do this” and “Stop,” 
and 45.7% cried or sobbed.
100
  These women sent pretty clear signals.
101
  
Ninety-four percent of men will not have intercourse with a woman who is 
struggling, sobbing, and saying, “stop.”  Six percent will, and as Thomas 
MacAulay Miller phrases it, “It’s not that they don’t understand, they just 
don’t like the answer.”
102
 
The overwhelming majority of both men and women have only had 
consensual sexual experiences, where both have known whether consent 
was communicated and where both have respected that communication.  
This overwhelming majority should have accurate relational schemas
103
 
                                                                                                     
 99. Lisak & Miller, supra note 88, at 78. 
 100. Koss et al., supra note 94, at 12 tbl.2. 
 101. Some research exists that advances the idea that up to 40% of women have said 
“no” when they mean “yes.”  See Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do 
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Unwanted Sexual Intercourse: College Students’ Dating Experiences in Three Countries, 31 
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research because, among other things, the instrument used in these studies has serious 
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 102. Thomas MacAulay Miller, Mythcommunication: It’s Not That They Don’t 
Understand, They Just Don’t Like the Answer, YES MEANS YES (Mar. 21, 2011), 
http://yesmeansyesblog.wordpress.com/2011/03/21/mythcommunication-its-not-that-they-
dont-understand-they-just-dont-like-the-answer/. 
 103. See generally Mark W. Baldwin, Relational Schemas and the Processing of Social 
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based on their own experiences that they can be applied to these legal 
problems.  Instead, the “mythcommunication” schema perseveres.   
This is likely because the basic dating script that leads to the critical 
moment—“that men are expected to initiate sexual relations and women are 





  Men and women, for better or for worse, still send 
signals that they are interested in someone and potentially interested in sex.  
And when an ingroup man takes the risk of making the first move, those in 
the ingroup will forgive that first move—even though the “first move” for a 
rapist is part of an event schema that is completely different that the one 
imagined by the problem solvers.  
The last rape schema is that the woman consented and is lying about it 
now.  Some women do lie about sexual assault and some men are falsely 
accused.  David Lisak and colleagues reviewed the reliable research in this 
area and reported that these studies find that 2.1–10.9% of rape reports are 
false,
106
 where false reports are defined as “a thorough investigation must 
yield evidence that a crime did not occur.”
107
   
However, this schema is given much more strength than it deserves.  A 
man does not run a 2–11% chance of being falsely accused after having 
consensual sex.  The probability of being falsely accused after having 
consensual sex is much, much lower.  The probability of being falsely 
accused after a consensual sexual encounter is the number of false 
allegations divided by the number of consensual sexual encounters. 
For example, looking at the military population, the Department of 
Defense reported that there were 5,061 sexual assault reports in 2013.
108
  
Applying the Lisak figures would mean that there around 100-500 false 
reports.  Assume that these accusations all involved consensual sex acts 
(and not accusations where no sex acts occurred).  There are roughly 1.4 
million active-duty service members.  Now consider how many consensual 
                                                                                                     
Information, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 461 (1992). 
 104. Antonia Abbey, Alcohol-Related Sexual Assault: A Common Problem Among 
College Students, 14 J. STUDIES ON ALCOHOL (SUPPLEMENT 14) 118, 120–21 (2002). 
 105. See Asia Anna Eaton & Suzanna Rose, Has Dating Become More Egalitarian? A 
35 Year Review Using Sex Roles, 64 SEX ROLES 843, 855 (2011) (reporting that traditional 
gender stereotypes still remain in place in courtship despite progress in other areas). 
 106. David Lisak et al., False Allegations of Sexual Assault:  An Analysis of Ten Years 
of Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1330 (2010).  
 107. Id. at 1319. 
 108. U.S. DEP’T DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 2 
(2013). 
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sex acts those service members had in 2013.  Some of them are married or 
in long-term relationships, but even if we estimate that there were 500,000 
consensual sex acts outside of long-term relationships (the type of cases 
that the legal problems solvers are most often called on to judge), 100–500 
false reports would be a very, very small percentage of the overall 
consensual acts. 
The probability that “but for the grace of God go I” is very small, but 
the false complaint schema is still powerful and in use.
109
  This is likely 
because false reports are reported as a percentage of all sexual assault 
reports (which are themselves a small percentage of all sexual assaults)
110
 
rather than as raw number or as a percentage of all consensual sexual 
encounters. 
In addition, when the victim has inconsistencies in her statement and 
the problem solver uses the “women lie” schema, the problem solver is 
likely to conclude that the woman lied.  But we now know that victims have 
memory problems that are a direct result of the trauma they experience.  
The trauma itself causes problems in the perception of the event, the 
recording of those perceptions into memory, and recall of those perceptions, 
particularly when victims are interviewed shortly after the event.
111
 When a 
problem solver uses the schema that women lie, those problems of 
perception, recording, and recall look like lies or reasons not to believe the 
victim rather than as evidence of the trauma itself.  
We saw above that if the schemas are faulty, the entire inference 
process is compromised.  The schemas that people often use in rape cases 
are faulty.  We also saw that certain ingroups—those with traditional 
gender role beliefs and conservatives—hold these schemas at higher levels 
than those with the opposite worldviews.  This is a problem.  Those 
ingroups are using an inferential reasoning process that is compromised.  
Not surprisingly, we saw that when these ingroups solve legal problems, 
they solve them in favor of the man at a higher rate than those with the 
opposite worldviews. 
                                                                                                     
 109. Overestimating how often two events occur together is called the illusory 
correlation.  FISKE, supra note 5, at 141. 
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 111. Campbell, supra note 93; Shifting the Paradigm for Investigating Trauma 
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That cognitive flow may explain why the military has not made 
progress on the sexual assault problem, as critics claim.  If the military 
population is more traditional or conservative than the general population, 
then the military population would likely use those inaccurate schemas at a 
higher rate than those in the general population would.  The inferential 
reasoning problem would be amplified. 
IV.  Social Cognition, Rape, and the Military 
A.  Social Cognition in the Military 
The military recognizes social cognition principles and has adopted 
them into its official decision making process, largely in response to the 
problems the military had in Iraq.  In 2006, after a tour as a division 
commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus took command of the academic 
center of the Army, the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas.
112
  There, he oversaw the redrafting of Army and Marine Corps 
counterinsurgency doctrine.
113
  He recognized that the military did not 
understand the operational environment in Iraq, that the military was 
fighting an insurgency using tactics designed for conventional wars, and 
that the military needed to rethink the way that it thinks.
114
   The resulting 
manual was part of his call for change.   
The manual explicitly incorporates social cognition principles: 
The way that a culture influences how people view their world is 
referred to as their worldview.  Many people believe they view their 
world accurately, in a logical, rational, unbiased way. However, people 
filter what they see and experience according to their beliefs and 
worldview. Information and experiences that do not match what they 
believe to be true about the world are frequently rejected or distorted to 
fit the way they believe the world should work. More than any other 
factor, culture informs and influences that worldview. In other words, 




                                                                                                     
 112. Peter Bergen, How Petraeus Changed the U.S. Military, CNN (Nov. 11, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/10/opinion/bergen-petraeus-legacy/. 
 113. Id.; LINDA ROBINSON, TELL ME HOW THIS ENDS 76–83 (2008). 
 114. The manual contains a full chapter on understanding the operational environment.  
U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-24, INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERING INSURGENCIES, 
2-1 (2014). 
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From that paragraph, we see that the military recognizes that cultural 
worldviews (i.e., group identities) influence perceptions and interpretations 
of events (i.e., outcome judgments) according to beliefs (i.e., schemas).  
The military also recognizes that people experience naïve realism, which is 
“the notion that one sees the world objectively (even though we suspect that 
others may not).”
116
  Those in the ingroup filter information through their 
worldview but believe that they are approaching the problem in a logical, 
rational, unbiased way. 
In addition to revamping its counterinsurgency doctrine, the military 
also changed its official problem solving process.  Prior to the shift in 
thinking brought about by General Petraeus, the military had been slavishly 
following a rigid, formal system called the Military Decision Making 
Process.  Commanders and their staffs became masters at that system, 
seeking discrete inputs and producing beautifully written plansbut these 
plans were often designed “to fight the wrong problem.”
117
  Having failed 
to correctly visualize the current problem at the start of the process, 
commanders would “end up fighting the last war.”
118
 
Starting in 2008, the military began to adopt a problem solving process 
called “design.”
119
  Under design methodology, commanders first aim to 
understand the current environment (“What is going on?”)
120
 and they then 
visualize the desired end state (“What should the environment look 
like?”).
121
 That frames the problem and helps the commander to produce a 
problem statement (“How do we get from here to there?”).
122
   
In this methodology, commanders must understand the operational 
environment and the current situation.  They do this by using their 
“experience, intellect, creativity, intuition, education, [and] judgment.”
123
  
                                                                                                     
 116. FISKE, supra note 5, at 84. 
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In other words, commanders use especially wise generalizations about how 
the world works.   
Frequently, commanders must rely on event schemas to understanding 
the environment: 
In a broad sense, a narrative is a story constructed to give meaning to 
things and events. Individuals, groups, organizations, and countries all 
have narratives with many components that reflect and reveal how they 
define themselves. Political parties, social organizations, and 
government institutions, for example, all have stories bound 
chronologically and spatially . . . . To narrate is to engage in the 
production of a story—an explanation of an event or phenomenon by 
proposing a question or questions in relation to the artifacts themselves. 
These questions may include—What is the meaning of what I see?  
Where does the story begin and end?  What happened, is happening, and 
why?  
Narrative construction—the conscious bounding of events and artifacts 
in time and space—is central to framing. Commanders, staffs, and unified 
action partners construct a narrative to help understand and explain the 
operational environment, the problem, and the solutions.
124
 
If the commander’s intuition and knowledge is wrong, or if the 
commander is using inaccurate event schemas, then the commander will not 
have an accurate understanding of the operational environment.  If so, the 
commander will not be able to properly frame the problem or visualize the 
solution.
125
   
How commanders frame the problem drives the solution that they 
choose for that problem.  The military provides an example of this in the 
context of a combat operation:  “How individuals or groups frame a 
problem will influence potential solutions. For example, an organization 
that frames an insurgent group as ‘freedom fighters’ probably will approach 
solving a conflict differently from an organization that frames the insurgent 
group as ‘terrorists.’”
126
   
In the sexual assault context, if commanders understand the sexual 
assault environment to be one where only deviants rape, they will approach 
the problem much differently than if they recognize that the rapists come 
from the ingroup.  A commander who frames the accused service member 
as a good soldier will solve the problem much differently than one who 
frames him as a potential rapist. 
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 125. Id. at 1-3.  
 126. Id. at 2-5. 
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If those in the military who handle sexual assault cases are overly 
represented by certain worldviews (like traditional gender role beliefs or 
conservatism), then those worldviews would likely influence their 
perceptions and interpretations of the sexual assault cases that they are 
responsible for solving.  They will likely be using inaccurate schemas, 
particularly event schemas or narrative constructions about what “real” rape 
looks like, and this will cause them to improperly frame the problem.  And 
these problem solvers would likely believe that they are approaching the 
problem in a logical, rational, unbiased wayeven if they are not. 
B.  Traditional Gender Role Beliefs and Conservatism in the Military 
Two studies of military populations provide insight into the levels of 
traditional gender role beliefs and conservatism in the military.  Both 
studies gathered data on a narrower sub-population of the militarythe 
officers.  From these narrow populations come the convening authorities 
and policy makers. 
First, the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) conducted the 
Survey on the Military in the Post Cold War Era in 1998 as part of a larger 
research project on civil-military relations.
127
  The researchers sought to 
identify and measure differences in belief systems held by the elite military 
population, the elite civilian population, and the general population;
128
 to 
explore whether there was a gap in beliefs; and to estimate whether any gap 
harmed military effectiveness or civil-military relations.
129
 The general 
concern was that the military (particularly the officer corps) was becoming 
increasingly conservative and aligned with the Republican Party and might 
otherwise hold contempt for civilian society.
130
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The TISS project gathered data from certain military leaders: mid-
career officers who were attending staff colleges, more senior officers who 
were attending war colleges, and general officers attending a required 
course.
131
  The researchers also gathered data from selected groups of 
civilian leaders and from the general civilian population.
132
 
The TISS survey included an item that measured one facet of 
traditional gender role expectations: that family labor should be divided 
such that women should work at home.  The item asked whether mothers 
should be encouraged “to stay at home with their children rather than 
working outside the home.”
133
  This item was administered to the sample of 
civilian leaders (but not the general public sample) and military leaders.  Of 
the civilian leaders, 41% agreed strongly or somewhat that women should 
be encouraged to stay at home.  Of the military leaders, 51% agreed.
134
  The 
data suggests that, at least for this facet of traditional gender role beliefs, 
the military leaders are more traditional. 
The TISS survey also included an item that asked the respondents to 
label themselves along a liberal to conservative spectrum.
135
  The 
researchers reported the following for the general public non-veterans and 
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Table 1: Political self-label comparison, TISS general population non-
veteran and military leaders, by percent 




Very liberal 7.4 0.3 
Somewhat liberal 21.1 4.1 
Moderate 27.3 28.4 
Somewhat conservative 26.9 53.8 
Very conservative 11.5 12.8 
Displayed graphically, the difference between the two samples is very 
apparent:  
Figure 1: Political self-label comparison, TISS general population 
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The data suggests that the military leadersthe potential convening 
authorities and policy makersare much more conservative than those who 
are in the general population who are not themselves veterans. 
In the second study, conducted in 2004, Jason Dempsey surveyed the 
active duty Army population looking for answers to the same basic 
questions posed by the TISS researchers.
137
  Unlike the TISS survey, which 
only looked at selected ranks, Dempsey surveyed the entire rank population 
with a few minor exceptions.
138
  Another significant difference between his 
study and the TISS study is that he only looked at the Army population 
while the TISS survey looked at all branches of service. 
Dempsey included a gender-role item in his study.  He chose his item 
language because it was used in the 2004 National Annenberg Election 
Survey and he wanted to make direct comparisons between his sample and 
samples taken from the general population.
139
  The item language is:  
“Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in 
running business, industry, and government.  Others feel that the woman’s 
place is in the home.  Where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 
being an equal role for women and 7 being a woman’s place is in the 
home?”  Dempsey reports that 60% of the civilian population (sampled in 
the Annenberg survey) fully agreed that women should have an equal role, 
while only 49% of Army officers in his sample fully agreed.
140
   
Dempsey also included an item that asked the respondents to label 
themselves along a liberal to conservative spectrum.  He found that the 
entire Army population looked very much like the general public;
141
 
however, he also found that “the similarity between the general American 
population and the army population masks two very different populations in 
the Army data set.  One is heavily conservative but relatively small (the 
officer corps), and the other is more moderate and liberal but much larger 
(the enlisted ranks).”
142
  Comparing the responses from the officers in his 
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Table 2: Political self-label comparison, Dempsey general population 
and Army officers, by percent 
Response General public 
 
Army officers 
Liberal 24 14 
Moderate 39 23 
Conservative 37 63 
 
Displayed graphically, the difference between the two samples becomes 
very apparent:  
Figure 2: Political self-label comparison, Dempsey general 
population and Army officers, by percent 
 
The data suggests that the Army officer populationthe population that 
produces the potential convening authorities and strategic policy 
makersis much more conservative than the general population. 
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Both studies suggest that the military population that makes the 
decisions on military justice and sets sexual assault policy is much more 
traditional than the general public, at least toward one facet of traditional 
gender role beliefs,
144
 and more conservative than the general population.  
As discussed above, research indicates that people with those worldviews 
are more likely to use inaccurate rape schemas when solving sexual assault 
problems.  This suggests that the problem of a compromised inferential 
reasoning processthe use of inaccurate rape schemas which results in 
untrustworthy outcome judgmentsis exacerbated in this population within 
this military community.  
C. Examples of the Use of Rape Schemas in the Military 
The data from those two studies suggests that the population that 
produces convening authorities and strategic policy makers is more 
traditional and conservative than the general public.  Other research 
suggests that those who are traditional and conservative subscribe to 
inaccurate rape schemas at a higher rate that those who have the opposite 
worldview.  In addition to that inferential reasoning problem, and it may 
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response would be running against the norms professed by the military leadership. 
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turn out that some of these inaccurate schemas are amplified within the 
military context.   
The schema that only deviants rape (and good guys do not) is greatly 
intensified in the military: 
Some social scientists have noted that considering the “character and 
military service of the accused” when deciding the disposition of a 
sexual assault allegation may be based on false beliefs about who 
perpetrates sexual assault.  They argue that sexual predators are adept at 
being likeable to authority figures and are “such masters of the ‘hidden 
persona’ . . . that their colleagues and commanders are often happy to 
offer positive character testimony to investigators and courts-
martial.” . . . [M]ore than a decade of war has led military leaders to 
value achievement in combat above all other characteristics, and that 
this has created a situation where commanders tend to overlook or 
tolerate sexually abusive conduct among subordinates.
145
 
Not only is the offender a member of the ingroup, he may be a hero within 
the ingroup. 
This schema played a large role in the recent reversal of the conviction 
of an Air Force pilot.  The pilot, Lieutenant Colonel James Wilkerson, had 
been convicted by a court-martial composed of panel members of sexually 
assaulting a guest at his house.
146
  The convening authority, Lieutenant 
General Craig Franklin, overturned the panel’s findings.  In a letter to the 
Secretary of the Air Force, General Franklin explained his reasoning: 
I was perplexed in relation to this conundrumLt Col Wilkerson was a 
selectee for promotion to full colonel, a wing inspector general, a career 
officer, and described as a doting father and husband.  However, 
according to the version of events presented by the prosecution, Lt Col 
Wilkerson, in the middle of the night, decided to leave his wife sleeping 
in his bed, walk downstairs past the room of his only son, and also near 
another room with two other sleeping guest-children, and then he 
decided to commit the egregious crime of sexually assaulting a sleeping 
woman who he and his wife had only met earlier that night.
147
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 147. Letter from Lieutenant General Craig Franklin, Commander, Third Air Force, to 
Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley 6 (Mar. 12, 2013), available at 
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General Franklin was perplexed (as in, he experienced cognitive 
dissonance) because his schema of a rapist did not match the information he 
received about Colonel Wilkerson.  That schema prevented General 
Franklin from understanding the operating environment. 
A recent military appellate case also illustrates the power of the “only 
deviants rape” schema.  In United States v. Lucas,
148
 a service member was 
convicted of rape by court-martial composed of panel members.  In the 
military, the first level of appellate courts (composed of military judge 
advocates) can make independent factual findings and decide for itself 
whether the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
149
  Here, the 
military appellate court reversed that panel’s finding and dismissed the 
charge with prejudice.
150
   
The court in Lucas reversed the panel’s decision in large part because 
the judges used the “only deviants rape” schema.  The court stated, “We 
find that the explanations [the accused] gave to the [investigator] regarding 
the events . . . are believable, especially considering the evidence of his 
good military character and service history admitted at sentencing.”
151
  In 
the military, evidence of good military character can be admitted during the 
guilt-phase of the trial to prove that the accused did not commit the 
offense.
152
  Even so, the court should not have used evidence admitted 
during the sentencing proceeding to decide a guilt-phase questionbut that 
evidence was inconsistent with a powerful schema (only deviants rape) and 
this court could not avoid the temptation to use it.  According to this court, 
those with good military character are not deviants and so do not rape.  At 
the very least, they tell the truth to investigators. 
                                                                                                     
 148. See generally United States v. Lucas, No. 201100372, 2012 CCA Lexis 322 (N-M. 
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Turning to schemas related to whether the woman actually consented 
and so must be lying about it now, these schemas also appear to still be in 
use in the military.  One the schemasthat real victims fight backis 
likely amplified in the military.  Most service members, including women, 
receive training on how to fight in close quarters.  The amplified schema 
here would be, real victims fight back, especially when they have received 
training in how to fight.   
Returning to Lucas, we find that reasoning.  The court stated, “It is 
illogical to believe that a man weighing just over 200 pounds could 
accomplish [the rape] against a female Marine, trained in Marine Corps 
Martial Arts, weighing 155 pounds, under the circumstances as described in 
the record before us.”
153
  If she were a real victim, she would have fought 
back; she did not, so she must have consented and is lying about it now. 
It is illogical to believe that a real victim trained in martial arts would 
not fight backif you apply incorrect schemas.  If you apply schemas that 
are informed by neuropsychology, it makes perfect sense.  In these kinds of 
sexual assaults, the woman is often not aware that she is in danger.  She is 
not on patrol, adrenaline pumping, anticipating an attack from the enemy 
that might end in a close-quarters knife fight. In those situations, knowing 
martial arts might be useful.  In a sexual assault case where the woman 
trusts the person she is with and is not anticipating danger, the attack will 
likely be over before the woman understands what just happened.  Here, the 
court expected a 155-pound woman to use martial arts against a 207-pound 
Marine Corps non-commissioned officer who, by the way, was also trained 
in martial arts, when his brain was ready for the assault and hers was not.  
That is illogical.   
The schema that women frequently lie about sexual assault is still 
officially endorsed by the military.  In 2012, the Department of the Army 
published Army 2020:  Generating Health & Discipline in the Force,
154
 an 
exhaustive report on health and crime in the Army.  The tone of the portion 
of the report that dealt with misconduct was about cracking down on 
misconduct committed by people whom we would consider to be outgroup 
service membersthose who use drugs, go absent without leave, steal, 
commit assaults.  
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In the discussion of sexual assault, however, the tone changes.  The 
authors tell us that: 
Consistent with the civilian literature, reporting of sexual offenses 
(particularly for rape and aggravated sexual assault) include both 
legitimate and false allegations. A review of FBI data for sexual assaults 
across a seven‐year period found that approximately 25% of sexual 
assaults referred to the FBI involved false allegations (based on post‐
arrest and post‐conviction DNA exonerations).155 
Note that those figures apply to stranger sexual assaults.  In non-stranger 
sexual assault, identity (and DNA evidence) is not an issue.  Stranger sexual 
assault is not the problem facing the military.  The authors of this section do 
not appear to understand the problem.
156
 
The authors then cite discredited research to report that 23–50% of 
rape allegations are false
157
 and then tell us why women lie about rape:  
“The same article posited several key motivations behind false allegations, 
including: (1) a need for an alibi to compensate for problems arising from 
consensual sex, (2) in retribution for a perceived wrong such as rejection or 
betrayal, and (3) to satisfy a need for attention or other material gain.”
158
  
The authors then continue by reporting that the “veracity of the complaint 
must be questioned to preserve the presumption of innocence because ‘sex 
crimes are the only crimes that do not require corroborating evidence for 
conviction.’”
 159
  The last part of that statement is simply inaccurate, and the 
authors do not make a similar point about the credibility of people who 
allege theft or simple assault or any other crimes.  
In contrast to the authors’ treatment of other crimes, where the focus is 
on catching and convicting outgroup service members, in the sexual assault 
context, the focus is how women lie about sexual assault.  When offenders 
otherwise look super-ingroup (they are good soldiers), the ingroup needs a 
really good explanation for why so many from the ingroup are being 
accused of sexual assault.  The Army’s top law enforcement officials 
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explanation is that upward of half of the women are lying.  The Army’s top 
law enforcement officials do not understand the problem. 
The Franklin letter, the Lucas case, and the Army report are anecdotes 
and are low-hanging fruit at that.  General Franklin, the judges in Lucas, 
and the authors of the Army report obviously used inaccurate rape 
schemas.
160
  But they all serve as contemporary examples of how these rape 
schemas operate with greater intensity in the military, and they serve as 
examples of how many in the military who are charged with solving these 
problems cannot properly frame these problems.  They do not understand 
the current conditions of the operational environment and so cannot 
visualize the proper end state.  They have a cognitive blind spot. 
V.  Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This article suggests that the military populations that produce 
convening authorities and policy makers are overrepresented by people who 
are traditional and conservative.  Other research has shown that those 
ingroups use inaccurate rape schemas to solve sexual assault problems at a 
higher rate than those with other worldviews.  And research has shown that 
those ingroups choose outcome judgments that favor the man more than 
those with other worldviews.  They cannot visualize what is happening 
during these assaults.  They do not understand the operating environment.  
They have a blind spot. 
This article suggests that some of the criticisms of the military’s 
handling of sexual assault cases are accuratethat those who handle these 
cases follow a cognitive process that seeks to rationalize why a good, 
ingroup man would be accused of sexual assault and that explains away 
why an outgroup woman would accuse him of sexual assault.  The research 
suggests that this problem is not based on hostile sexism, though; rather, it 
is likely based on benign sexism related to traditional gender role beliefs, 
particularly beliefs about how women should behave sexually. 
There are three basic proposals for reform.
161
  One is that we give 
these cases to civilian law enforcement.  However, giving these cases to 
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other civilian law enforcement agencies will not likely change anything.  
Many other law enforcement jurisdictions are also under serious 
criticism.
162
  These other law enforcement agencies may have populations 
that are very similar to the military population and may rely on the same 
schemas.   
The second is that we give these cases to someone outside of the chain 
of command, either a military prosecutor from outside of that chain of 
command,
163
 an independent military convening authority,
164
 or 
independent director of prosecution within the Department of Defense.
165
  
The rationale is that this will erase the potential conflict of interest that a 
convening authority faces when the accused and victim both come from the 
convening authority’s command.  However, giving these decisions to 
military lawyers or independent convening authorities will not likely 
change anything.  The ingroup/outgroup distinction is not based on what 
unit the accused or the victim belong to; rather, the distinction is based on 
what social group they belong to. 
Further, we can infer that these military lawyers and this other 
convening authority are also likely traditional and conservative and so will 
use these inaccurate rape schemas.  In addition, many of these lawyers 
served as defense counsel in sexual assault cases (in the military, it is 
common practice for judge advocates to serve as both prosecutors and 
defense counsel).  As defense counsel, they probably reinforced pre-
existing rape schemas as they defended these cases.  They may not be able 
to unlearn those cognitive processes.  The military lawyers may be the 
worst option. 
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The third option is to keep the status quo.  A bill that recently passed 
the Senate would require the military to ask the victim whether she wanted 
the case to go to court-martial or a civilian jurisdiction, and then to give that 
preference great weightbut preserves the status quo.
166
  Under this option, 
commanders will continue to make decisions likely using inaccurate rape 
schemas, while receiving advice from lawyers who are likely using 
inaccurate rape schemas, and the victim’s only other option is to take the 
case to civilian law enforcement officials who are likely using inaccurate 
rape schemas. 
Real reform requires that the people who resolve these legal problems 
do so without the influence of these rape schemas.  We could choose to 
keep the current structurebut only if we could commit to intensively 
training each general court-martial convening authority and his or her staff 
judge advocate and then certifying that they are free of these schemas.  We 
could choose to use centralized decision makersbut only if they are 
certified as free of these schemas.  We could choose to let local law 
enforcement offices handle these casesbut only if the people in those 
offices are free of these schemas. 
The decision then turns on which is the most efficient system.  
Congress cannot likely fund and supervise the training of every local law 
enforcement office.  Centralized decision makers will likely greatly 
increase transaction costsprimarily, case-processing times.  The best 
solution may be to keep the current structure but to require that general 
courts-martial convening authorities and staff judge advocates be certified 
after having gone through intensive (probably multi-day) training on the 
realities of sexual assault.   
The findings from this study go beyond just these commanders and 
their lawyers.  These findings also suggest that the entire population that 
handles these cases (investigators, trial attorneys, trial and appellate judges, 
panel members) may be more likely to use this cognitive processing than 
members of the general public.  All of these actors should be trained and 
certified before being allowed to act on these cases.  With this training and 
certification, Congress could reach the ultimate goala system that is free 
of inaccurate schemas, not just one that is no worse than the others around. 
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